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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/820,843	03/30/2001	Samir Kumar Brahmachari	Q63915	7045
7:	590 11/19/2004	EXAMINER		
SUGHRUE, MION, ZINN, MACPEAK & SEAS, PLLC 2100 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, DC 20037-3213			SMITH, CAROLYN L	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
WASHINGTON, DC 20037 3213			. 1631	
			DATE MAILED: 11/19/200-	4

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

	Application No.	Applicant(s)
	09/820,843	BRAHMACHARI ET AL.
Office Action Summary	Examiner	Art Unit
	Carolyn L Smith	1631
The MAILING DATE of this communication	appears on the cover sheet wi	th the correspondence address
Period for Reply		ONTHIO FROM
A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR RE THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATIO  Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFF after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication  If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a  If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period for reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by st Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the meanned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).	N. R 1.136(a). In no event, however; may a r reply within the statutory minimum of thirt riod will apply and will expire SIX (6) MON atute, cause the application to become AE	reply be timely filed  ty (30) days will be considered timely.  ITHS from the mailing date of this communication.  BANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133).
Status		
1) Responsive to communication(s) filed on 1	4 September 2004.	
	This action is non-final.	
3) Since this application is in condition for allo		
closed in accordance with the practice und	er <i>Ex par</i> te <i>Quayle</i> , 1935 C.D	). 11, 453 O.G. 213.
Disposition of Claims		
4)⊠ Claim(s) <u>20-30,32 and 33</u> is/are pending in	the application.	
4a) Of the above claim(s) is/are with	•	
5) Claim(s) is/are allowed.	\	
6)⊠ Claim(s) <u>20-30 and 32-33</u> is/are rejected.	!	
7) Claim(s) is/are objected to.		
8) Claim(s) are subject to restriction ar	nd/or election requirement.	
Application Papers		
9)☐ The specification is objected to by the Exan	niner.	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	accepted or b)  objected to	by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to	the drawing(s) be held in abeyar	nce. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the co		
11)☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the	e Examiner. Note the attache	d Office Action or form PTO-152.
Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119		
12) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for for	eign priority under 35 U.S.C.	§ 119(a)-(d) or (f).
a) All b) Some * c) None of:		
1. Certified copies of the priority docum	nents have been received.	
2. Certified copies of the priority docum	nents have been received in A	Application No
3. Copies of the certified copies of the	priority documents have beer	received in this National Stage
application from the International Bu		
* See the attached detailed Office action for a	list of the certified copies not	received.
Attachment(s)		
1) Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)	· —	Summary (PTO-413)
2) Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948	- This c	(s)/Mail Date Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
3) Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SI Paper No(s)/Mail Date	6) Other:	

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# **DETAILED ACTION**

A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicants' submission, filed 9/14/04, has been entered.

It is noted that the headers of the Amendments to the claims and Remarks sections, filed 9/14/04, list the incorrect application number.

Amended claims 20, 26-28, 30, 32, and 33 and canceled claim 31, filed 9/14/04, are acknowledged.

Claims herein under examination are 20-30 and 32-33.

## Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101

35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

Claims 20-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claims are directed to non-statutory subject matter. As written, claims 20-28 encompass a method performed on a computer that appears to lack any physical result performed outside of a computer.

As stated in MPEP § 2106, (IV)(B)(2)(b), to be statutory, a claimed computer-related process must either: (A) result in a physical transformation outside the computer for which a

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practical application in the technological arts is either disclosed in the specification or would have been known to a skilled artisan (discussed in MPEP § 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b)(i)), or (B) be limited to a practical application within the technological arts (discussed in MPEP § 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b)(ii)).

As stated in MPEP § 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b)(i), the independent physical acts may be post-or pre-computer processing activity as described below:

A process is statutory if it requires physical acts to be performed outside the computer independent of and following the steps to be performed by a programmed computer, where those acts involve the manipulation of tangible physical objects and result in the object having a different physical attribute or structure. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187, 209 USPQ at 8. Thus, if a process claim includes one or more post-computer process steps that result in a physical transformation outside the computer (beyond merely conveying the direct result of the computer operation), the claim is clearly statutory.

Another statutory process is one that requires the measurements of physical objects or activities to be transformed outside of the computer into computer data (In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32, 41 n.7, 201 USPQ 136, 145 n.7 (CCPA 1979) (data-gathering step did not measure physical phenomenon); Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1056, 22 USPQ2d at 1036), where the data comprises signals corresponding to physical objects or activities external to the computer system, and where the process causes a physical transformation of the signals which are intangible representations of the physical objects or activities. Schrader, 22 F.3d at 294, 30 USPQ2d at 1459 citing with approval Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058-59, 22 USPQ2d at 1037-38; Abele, 684 F.2d at 909, 214 USPQ at 688; In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 790, 214 USPQ 678, 681 (CCPA 1982).

As stated in MPEP § 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b)(ii), the computer-related process may be limited to a practical application in the technological arts as described below:

There is always some form of physical transformation within a computer because a computer acts on signals and transforms them during its operation and changes the state of its components during the execution of a process. Even though such a physical transformation occurs within a computer, such activity is not determinative of whether the process is statutory because such transformation alone does not distinguish a statutory computer process from a nonstatutory computer process. What is determinative is not how the computer performs the process, but what the computer does to achieve a practical application. See Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1057, 22 USPQ2d at 1036.

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Claims 20-28 do not fulfill either of these statutory requirements and are therefore rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claims are directed to non-statutory subject matter.

Claims 20-28 appear to lack a practical application as stated in MPEP § 2106 IV.B.2.b.ii.

Regarding practical application, the MPEP § 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b)(ii) states the following example:

A computer process that simply calculates a mathematical algorithm that models noise is nonstatutory. However, a claimed process for digitally filtering noise employing the mathematical algorithm is statutory.

Comparing the above scenario to claims 20-28, the claimed method that merely identifies an anti-infective is comparable to the nonstatutory example given above as it does not appear to have a valid practical application applied to the identification. The claimed invention falls more into the example of noise analysis. In this example, it is not until the noise is filtered that a practical application is clearly expressed. In the instant invention, clarification in the claims of what practical application the identification provides would nullify this rejection.

Claims 20-28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claims are directed to non-statutory subject matter. As written, the claims appear to be directed to a method that merely manipulates numbers, abstract concepts or ideas, or signals representing any of the foregoing. This rejection is necessitated by amendment.

As stated in MPEP § 2106, (IV)(B)(1), if the "acts" of a claimed process manipulate only numbers, abstract concepts or ideas, or signals representing any of the foregoing, the acts are not being applied to appropriate subject matter. Schrader, 22 F.3d at 294-95, 30 USPQ2d at 1458-59.

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Thus, a process consisting solely of mathematical operations, i.e., converting one set of numbers into another set of numbers, does not manipulate appropriate subject matter and thus cannot constitute a statutory process.

In practical terms, claims define nonstatutory processes if they:

consist solely of mathematical operations without some claimed practical application (i.e., executing a "mathematical algorithm"); or
simply manipulate abstract ideas, e.g., a bid (Schrader, 22 F.3d at 293-94, 30 USPQ2d at 1458-59) or a bubble hierarchy (Warmerdam, 33 F.3d at 1360, 31 USPQ2d at 1759), without some claimed practical application.

Claims 20-28 do not fulfill any of these statutory requirements and are therefore rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claims are directed to non-statutory subject matter. This rejection is necessitated by amendment.

Applicants state that courts now recognize that computer programs and mathematical algorithms and/or formulas are patentable subject matter, so long as they are applied in a useful way. This statement is acknowledged; however, the method steps in claims 20-28 do not state how they are to be applied. Applicants state that the entire process may be performed by a computer. It is noted that there are two "safe harbors" for computer-related processes to be considered statutory, as described above, namely (A) result in a physical transformation outside the computer for which a practical application in the technological arts is either disclosed in the specification or would have been known to a skilled artisan (discussed in MPEP § 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b)(i)), or (B) be limited to a practical application within the technological arts (discussed in MPEP § 2106 (IV)(B)(2)(b)(ii)). Claims 20-28 appear to lack limitations containing these safe harbors, thus rendering them non-statutory. Applicants discuss Arrhythmia

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Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix, Corp., 22 USPQ2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992) and state that case is analogous to the present invention. It is noted that every patent application is examined on its own fact pattern. In instant claims 20-28, it is not clear what practical application the method steps provide. Instant claims 30, 32, and 33 mention diagnostic, therapeutic, and immunogenic applications that are practical applications so they are considered to be statutory. Instant claim 29 recites a display that displays results taking place outside of a computer so that the claim is considered statutory. Claims 20-28 fail recite a physical transformation outside of the computer or a practical application limitation in the actual method steps such that they cannot be considered to be statutory. Applicants state that identifying candidate anti-infectives is a useful purpose. This limitation found in the preamble essentially aims to further classify a protein but does not state a practical application for this classification in the method steps.

# Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 11, first paragraph

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 20-30 and 32-33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter that was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.

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## **NEW MATTER**

The comparison step (d) has been omitted in currently amended 20. Applicants state in the Remarks section, page 6, filed 9/14/04, that the recitation of "(d) comparing said outlier proteins to known proteins to identify a unique outlier protein" is removed as it is not an essential to the invention. This is found unpersuasive as the specification (page 8) states the present invention comprises steps i) through vi) which includes a matching step and selecting step assumed to be represented by the now omitted comparison step. This omission presents a conflict with what the specification describes as the present invention. Because the omission of the comparison step (d) does not appear to have adequate written support in the specification, claims, or drawings as originally filed, this omission is considered to be NEW MATTER.

Claims 21-30 and 32-33 are also rejected due to their dependency from claim 20.

### Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation have been summarized in Ex parte Forman, 230 USPQ 546 (BPAI 1986) and reiterated by the Court of Appeals in In re Wands, 8 USPQ2d 1400 at 1404 (CAFC 1988). The factors to be considered in determining whether undue experimentation is required include: (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount or direction presented, (3) the presence

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or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. The Board also stated that although the level of skill in molecular biology is high, the results of experiments in genetic engineering are unpredictable. While all of these factors are considered, a sufficient amount for a *prima facie* case are discussed below.

Claims 20-30 and 32-33 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. The claim(s) contains subject matter that was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention.

#### LACK OF ENABLEMENT

Claim 20, lines 3-4, recites the limitation that "all" protein sequences of a pathogenic organism are computationally analyzed. To date, no direct protein sequence determination method is known to one skilled in the art that would yield "all" protein sequences of any organism, even a simple organism. Therefore, such "all" protein sequences would have to be speculated via analysis of genomic sequences via start and stop codons which is a controversial procedure in humans. To date, there does not appear to be a study that verifies that this procedure has been fully accurate even for simple organisms. Therefore, it is unclear how one skilled in the art would be able to make and use this method including "all" protein sequences of a pathogenic organism. Claims 21-30 and 32-33 are also rejected due to their dependency from claim 20.

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#### Conclusion

No claim is allowed.

Papers related to this application may be submitted to Technical Center 1600 by facsimile transmission. Papers should be faxed to Technical Center 1600 via the PTO Fax Center located in Crystal Mall 1. The faxing of such papers must conform to the notices published in the Official Gazette, 1096 OG 30 (November 15, 1988), 1156 OG 61 (November 16, 1993), and 1157 OG 94 (December 28, 1993) (See 37 CFR §1.6(d)). The CM1 Fax Center number is (703) 872-9306.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Carolyn Smith, whose telephone number is (571) 272-0721. The examiner can normally be reached Monday through Thursday from 8 A.M. to 6:30 P.M.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Michael Woodward, can be reached on (571) 272-0722.

Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application should be directed to Legal Instruments Examiner Tina Plunkett whose telephone number is (571) 272-0549.

November 8, 2004

ARDIN H. MARSCHEL